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Market Failure and Reemergence: A Study of Chinese Firms Listed in the US 
 
ABSTRACT 
Our study documents a “Lemons” market failure of Chinese firms listed in the US in 2011 and a 
subsequent rebound by 2013. Our tests reveal that there was little difference in ex ante 
observable characteristics of fraudulent and non-fraudulent Chinese firms listed in the US prior 
to 2011 while entrepreneurs appear to have known their type. We document substantial costs of 
dishonesty and the failure of traditional market signaling mechanisms such as auditor or 
underwriter quality. We also show a return of Chinese firms after US and Chinese regulatory 
intervention in 2013 although this intervention was insufficient to fundamentally change the 
character of this market. Importantly, we find that factors capturing ex post settling up costs such 
as North America sales and CEO’s US education reduced the probability of financial fraud. Our 
results support the importance of legal and regulatory institutions as a necessary condition for 
properly functioning capital markets.   
 
JEL Codes: D81, D82, G15, G18, M41 
Keywords: Chinese Firms, IPOs, Frauds, Lemons market, Information Asymmetry.  
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Market Failure and Redemption: A Study of Chinese Firms Listed in the US 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Numerous studies in economics have examined the impact of information asymmetry in 
markets (e.g., see Stiglitz 2000, Riley 2001). Akerlof‘s (1970) seminal work characterizes a 
“Lemons” market and discusses the consequences of quality uncertainty for market failure. The 
notion of a market failure has been widely accepted and is characterized by a number of key 
features including quality uncertainty, significant information asymmetry, and high cost of 
dishonesty. In Akerlof’s model, asymmetric information may result in thin or nonfunctioning 
markets. However, a market failure has been rare because information asymmetry can be 
mitigated by private information search, mandatory disclosures, or court imposed penalties. In 
the US capital market, for example, we occasionally observe misrepresentation and financial 
fraud among public companies (e.g., Enron and WorldCom), but these incidents tend to be 
sporadic and have not led to widespread collapse of public markets. 
Recent developments in law and finance focus on the importance of strong regulatory and 
legal institutions as a precursor to developed markets. For example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Schleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Schleifer (2006) 
emphasize the enforcement of property rights, private contracts, and investor rights as essential 
to well-functioning capital markets. When legal institutions are unable to protect private property 
rights or facilitate private contracting, securities markets are unlikely to flourish.1 Thus, the law 
and finance perspective suggests that a market failure may arise when regulatory and legal 
institutions are unable to protect private property rights.  
                                                   
1 Klein and Leffler (1981) describe the origins of the implicit belief that enforcement is essential to well-functioning 
markets to early work by Hobbes (1651). Hobbes’ argument suggests that it is in societies’ best interest to accept a 
sovereign to assure fulfillment of agreements because “the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men’s ambition, 
avarice, anger, and other Passions without the fear of some coercive Power”. 
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In this paper, we investigate the importance of regulatory and legal institutions in a 
segment of the US market characterized by substantial asymmetric information and complex 
legal and regulatory issues. We exploit the group of Chinese firms listed in the US to examine 
the effect of quality uncertainty and regulatory structures on capital markets. The market for 
Chinese firms listed in the US is an anomalous case which exhibits features of a market collapse 
and subsequent reemergence. Specifically, rampant financial misrepresentations were discovered 
among the Chinese firms listed in the US in 2011. The large scale of suspected frauds 
significantly eroded investor confidence and precipitated a dramatic market collapse. Our study 
documents pervasive negative equity returns for 2011 to 2012, severely constrained liquidity, and 
very few new Chinese firm US IPOs (only 2 in 2012). This severe market implosion imposed 
significant costs on firm owners and investors. Since the market failed with existing market 
mechanisms, US and Chinese regulators intervened during 2011 to 2014 to facilitate Chinese 
firms’ reentry into the US equity market. Studying the US listed Chinese firm market collapse 
and reemergence helps us understand the necessary market, regulatory, and legal institutions 
required for a functioning capital market.  
Our pre-2011 and post-2011 samples consist of 279 and 25 Chinese firms traded on NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ, respectively.2 We capture the notion of “bad” firms (Lemons) as firms 
subject to: a SEC AAER (Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release), class action lawsuit, 
or accusation of fraud by the major Western media. We classify the remaining firms as “good” 
(Non-Lemons). This binary classification is the basis of a series of tests leading to the conclusion 
that the market for Chinese US listed firms was a “Lemons” market before 2011 and collapsed 
during 2011.  
                                                   
2 The pre-2011 firms include both IPOs and reverse mergers. A reverse merger allows a firm to become publicly 
traded by merging a shell company from a US public exchange with a non-listed company. No Chinese firms 
entered US markets post – 2011 using the reverse merger structure.   
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First, we document that pre-2011, investors were not able to differentiate good firms from 
bad firms using traditional signals of firm quality including a firm’s stock returns, earnings 
performance, accounting quality, and external monitoring mechanisms such as auditor and 
underwriter quality. In contrast, entrepreneurs knew their types. A number of firms announced 
privatization plans after the revelation of numerous frauds. These privatized firms paid large 
premiums (36.8% on average) to exit the US market and were less likely to be bad firms, 
consistent with significant information asymmetry between investors and entrepreneurs.  
Second, we demonstrate that the dishonesty of bad firms spread suspicion to all good 
Chinese firms listed in the US. We identify two firm specific events and find that the events lead 
to a spillover effect for all Chinese firms. For example, the 2011 Citron Research criticism of 
Harbin Electric Inc. led to a negative 6.1% return for the US-listed Chinese firms. This broad 
indictment of Chinese US listed firms made it very costly for new firms to raise capital in the US, 
suggesting a pervasive suspicion of all Chinese firms and entrepreneurs. 
Third, we investigate several market monitoring mechanisms to determine if these methods 
are effective in separating good from bad firms. Early literature suggests that counteracting 
institutional arrangements such as guarantees, reputation, and licensing can mitigate the impact 
of information asymmetry (e.g., Akerlof 1970, Klein and Leffler 1981). We find that typical 
proxies for these mechanisms such as auditor quality and underwriter reputation did not provide 
credible signals of firm quality.  
Finally, we provide evidence on the effect of regulatory and legal institutions on the 
reemergence of the US market for Chinese firms in 2013 and 2014. In response to the market 
collapse, the US and Chinese regulators employed the authority of each government to impose 
sanctions on Chinese firms seeking equity capital both domestically and globally. On May 7, 
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2013, US (“PCAOB”) and Chinese regulators (“CSRC” and “MoF”) signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) regarding their cooperation on production and exchange of audit 
documents relevant to their enforcement activities. On January 22, 2014, SEC Administrative 
Law Judge Cameron Elliot found that the Chinese affiliates of BDO, Ernst & Young, KPMG, 
Deloitte, and PricewaterhouseCoopers violated provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Judge Elliot’s ruling 
censured and denied Chinese affiliates of the global CPA firms the privilege of practicing before 
the SEC for a period of six months.3 Coincidently, the CSRC halted the approval of IPO 
applications on November 3, 2012, and restarted the process on December 30, 2013. These 
regulatory interventions sought to improve the quality of financial disclosures by Chinese firms 
by increasing governmental oversight of financial experts (auditors) and Chinese firms’ 
management. We demonstrate that the Chinese firm IPO market reacted favorably (or 
unfavorably) to revelation of increased (decreased) probability of cooperation between US and 
Chinese regulators.  With these interventions, the Chinese firm IPO market re-emerged in 2013 
and 2014. A total of 25 Chinese firms were able to raise $26.17 billion in the US IPO market. As 
a result of these regulators’ interventions, we show that the recent Chinese US IPO firms are 
quite similar to domestic US IPO firms.  
We also document an increase in the prevalence of the VIE structure, no reverse mergers, 
and greater use of prestigious underwriters as well as Big 4 Affiliates after regulatory 
                                                   
3Judge Elliott’s ruling would have had a profound impact on US listed global companies. Not only could it cause the 
loss of over $100 million in audit fees for Big 4 affiliated auditors in 2013 which accounts for 85% of all audit fees 
paid by US listed Chinese firms, it could also affect the audits of all US listed global firms with operations in China. 
Importantly, Judge Elliot’s decision imposed extraordinary pressure on auditors to remedy deficiencies in their 
Chinese affiliates. This ruling was appealed by the global firms and the ruling was stayed as negotiations between 
the US and China sought a solution to the issue of access to audit work papers. On February 6, 2015, the SEC 
announced a settlement with the Chinese affiliates of the Big 4. They each were required to pay a $500,000 penalty 
and take steps to provide audit work papers to the SEC investigators over the next four years.  
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intervention. The post-2011 Chinese firms listed on US markets exhibited increased assets, less 
profitability, negative accruals, and more losses than prior to the market failure. Finally, the post 
regulatory intervention Chinese IPO firms had greater post-IPO abnormal returns, greater 
institutional holdings, and lower return variability.  However, nine of the twenty-five post -2011 
IPO firms are currently the subject of class action lawsuits suggesting continuing regulatory 
challenges. 
To further examine the effect of legal enforcement (Shleifer and Vishny 1997), we identify 
CEO’s US education and North American Sales as proxies for the degree of legal protection and 
test for an association between both North America sales and CEO’s US education and the 
likelihood of financial frauds. We find that firms with North America sales or CEOs who were 
educated in US are less likely to misrepresent their firm’s financial condition. The evidence is 
consistent with the argument that strong legal enforcement provides a market bonding 
mechanism. 
Our study contributes to the literature on several dimensions: First, it is one of the few 
empirical studies documenting a market failure. Prior studies largely focus on stable, 
well-functioning markets. Market failure is rarely observed in these markets as investors’ diligent 
information search effectively reduces information asymmetry. However, we observe the 
Chinese firms listed in the US demonstrate all the features of the “Lemons market” discussed in 
Akerlof (1970). In this case, sovereignty issues create severe information frictions, limited 
regulation, and problems with property right enforcement that may lead to market failure. 
Second, we use a unique market setting to show that legal protection could play a 
significant role in governance of capital markets, supporting arguments in Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997). Proxies for legal enforcement – North America Sales or US educated CEOs – are 
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significantly associated with a lower likelihood of financial information misrepresentation. Our 
results suggest that regulators must design approaches to either provide oversight that assures the 
production and dissemination of high quality information or enforce property rights across 
national boundaries. Since national sovereignty and jurisdictional concern are major obstacles to 
the enforcement of property rights in the Chinese IPO market in the US, a well-functioning 
market for information, including effective monitoring of repeat players, is important to avoid 
future market failures.   
Our study is different from other work which examines various issues related to US listed 
Chinese firms. These other studies focus on specific aspects of Chinese reverse mergers such as 
earnings quality, fundamental performance, and price response and spillover effects (Lee, Li, and 
Zhang 2015, Chen et al. 2016, Givoly, Hayn, and Lourie 2014, Darrough 2015). In contrast, our 
study seeks to understand the impact of regulatory and legal institutions on global markets.   
Section 2 describes institutional background of the Chinese firm US securities market. 
Section 3 presents our research design and descriptive statistics. Sections 4 presents the evidence 
of market failure. Section 5 discusses the intervention of US and Chinese regulators and the 
reemergence of the market, and Section 6 concludes.  
2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
Chinese firms started to go public globally in the 1990s.4 From 1993 to 2001, the main 
source of overseas listed Chinese firms was State Owned Enterprises (SOE). Because overseas 
listings need special approval from the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 
Chinese firm IPO decisions are influenced by noneconomic factors such as political connections, 
geographical quotas, and industry status (Hung, Wong, and Zhang 2012). The first privately 
                                                   
4 Qingdao Beer became the first Chinese IPO on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on June 29, 1993 and Sinopec 
Shanghai Petrochemical was the first Chinese firm listed on NYSE on July 26, 1993. 
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controlled firm from China (Qiao Xing Universal Resources) went public in the US on February 
17, 1999. Since then, private Chinese firms have become major players in foreign capital 
markets. The popularity is also due to the fact that private firms in China find it very difficult to 
borrow money from local banks (Allen, Qian, and Qian 2005) and the existing debt market is 
small (Allen, Qian, Zhang, and Zhao 2013).   
CSRC imposes stricter requirements for firms listed domestically in China than 
internationally (CSRC 1999, 2006, 2009, 2012). These requirements consist of financial 
performance as well as political and government policy considerations. The Chinese government 
specifies industries in which foreign investments are encouraged, restricted, or prohibited. For 
example, foreign investors cannot invest directly in some industry sectors such as Internet, 
Telecommunication, Media, and Technology. The strict control over foreign investments by the 
Chinese government weakens China’s access to foreign financing. 
Chinese entrepreneurs creatively bypass the CSRC regulations through the Variable 
Interest Entity (VIE) corporate structure. Entrepreneurs set up an offshore company typically in 
the Cayman Islands, and then register a Chinese subsidiary in China as a wholly foreign owned 
enterprise (WFOE). The WFOE, the entrepreneurs, and the existing Chinese domestic company 
sign a series of contracts that transfer the WFOE resources into the domestic firm operating in 
the industry sectors not open to foreign investors. This structure gives the WFOE the right to 
claim economic benefits and impact operations of the domestic firm.5 Following this innovation, 
all Chinese firms from restricted industry sectors use the VIE structure to list in the US. The VIE 
structure remains controversial because it only provides foreign investors contractual control 
rather than ownership. If the contracts are breached, then the shareholders of the offshore 
                                                   
5 According to FASB Interpretation No. 46 “Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities”, which became effective in 
2002, the offshore company can consolidate all economic activities of the Chinese domestic company into its 
financial statements. SINA Corp. was the first firm to adopt a VIE structure for its IPO on April 13, 2000.  
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company may lose control of the domestic company.6  
Chinese entrepreneurs have also chosen another controversial approach, the reverse merger, 
to access US equity markets. When a Chinese firm is acquired by a shell firm publicly traded on 
a US stock exchange and the Chinese firm controls the shell company, the Chinese firm 
effectively becomes a US publicly listed firm.7  
These aggressive approaches to circumvent Chinese governmental restrictions and SEC 
scrutiny create uncertainty about ownership and managerial willingness to follow conventional 
norms of behavior. Thus, it would not be surprising to observe substantial information 
asymmetries in the Chinese firm US securities market. 
Chinese firms listed on US exchanges are subject to US domestic laws and regulations. 
Civil litigation can be pursued against the Chinese firms, auditors, and underwriters in US courts. 
However, there are a number of impediments to cross-border litigation that are unique to the case 
of Chinese firms. China prohibits depositions from being taken in China. Document discovery is 
similarly problematic. In a number of recent class action lawsuits, plaintiffs have sought to 
compare SEC financial reports with financial reports filed with the Chinese State Administration 
for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) and State Administration of Taxation (SAT) to support their 
claims. In response to these requests, China restricted access to these filings of Chinese 
companies. Also, China’s state secrecy laws have made document discovery cumbersome at best. 
Finally, enforcement of a US judgment is problematic because Chinese courts do not enforce US 
settlements in China.  
The financial information contained in an IPO registration statement must be certified by 
                                                   
6 The dispute between Alibaba and Yahoo! over the ownership of Alipay illustrates potential problems with this 
corporate control structure (Chao and Efrati, 2011).   
7 The reverse merger structure avoids the increased scrutiny of the SEC inherent in the registration process.   
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an independent accountant that is permitted to practice before the SEC.8 Many global auditing 
firms are structured as limited liability partnerships with the audit being done by their affiliates. 
Thus, SEC sanctions and US civil lawsuits are restricted to the Chinese affiliate of the global 
partnership, with all of the attendant problems of discovery and deposition prohibition limiting 
the effectiveness of enforcement of mechanisms to protect property rights.9 However, US courts 
do have wide discretion to enforce judgments against Chinese firms operating in the US.10  
In sum, responding to a highly regulated and restrictive domestic IPO market, some 
Chinese firms developed innovative structures and financing approaches to overcome restrictions. 
Although the innovations have been successful at circumventing the regulations, the resulting 
Chinese firm US securities market is a unique information environment that encouraged greater 
information asymmetry than in a strictly domestic market. Also, legal recourse against Chinese 
firms and their auditors and underwriters is significantly more difficult because of differences in 
US and Chinese law. Finally, US and Chinese regulatory action in response to the 2011 market 
collapse sought to strengthen the quality of information available in this market by increasing 
direct monitoring and possible sanctions against repeat players in the market. Thus, we consider 
the Chinese firm US securities market to be an ideal setting to examine the role of information 
asymmetry and legal and regulatory institutions on capital markets. 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE 
3.1 Research Design  
Our tests are designed to assess the vibrancy of the US market for Chinese firms after 
                                                   
8 See Securities Act of 1933. 
9 Auditor liability for Chinese financial statement frauds in the US is limited by an elevated scienter pleading 
requirement of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and the global network of auditing firms that 
limits liability to individual member firms not the consolidated entity (Barber 2013).   
10 D. Harris and R. Carlson, “Suing Chinese Companies: The New Wave,” Bloomberg Law Reports, June 10th 2011.  
The observation that US Courts can compel firms with US operations to pay damages suggests that firms with 
operations in North America and US educated executives will be less likely to provide misleading financial reports. 
11 
 
revelation of numerous accounting irregularities. We also compare the pre- and post-2011 US 
Chinese firm market to assess the impact of intervention by the US and Chinese regulators. 
A necessary condition to observe a market failure is that the market has a significant 
number of “Lemons.” Upon exposure of these “Lemons”, we expect market disruption to occur. 
Thus, our first tests examine stock returns, liquidity, and the vibrancy of the US Chinese firm 
market before the 2011 scandal.  
Our second tests examine the extent of information asymmetry between investors and 
entrepreneurs. For investors, we analyze the relation between the likelihood of a firm being a 
Lemon and traditional signals such as a firm’s fundamental performance, earnings quality, and 
monitoring mechanisms. For entrepreneurs, we investigate the decision to exit the US market. If 
privatized firms are Non-Lemons but cannot signal type with ex ante observable signals, we 
conclude that there is severe information asymmetry between investors and entrepreneurs.  
Our third tests are designed to highlight the costs of dishonesty. We identify two significant 
firm specific events to examine stock price reactions to all Chinese firms. If the entire portfolio 
of Chinese firm stock prices decline, we can infer that there is a significant cost of dishonesty – 
i.e., Non-Lemons are also being tarnished. 
Our fourth tests examine the impact of market mechanisms that might help to overcome 
the information asymmetry problem. We examine the effect of both external monitoring and 
legal protection. We consider auditor quality and underwriter reputation to assess the impact of 
monitoring mechanisms. Our measures of legal protection include the firm’s North American 
sales or CEO’s educational background. While the proxies for external monitoring mechanisms 
are common in the literature, our proxies for legal protection innovate by capturing the 
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entrepreneurs’ willingness to post a bond to assure quality.11  
To examine the reemergence of Chinese firms listed in the US following the responses of 
both US and Chinese regulatory agencies to the 2011 market failure, we first analyze market 
reactions to regulatory intervention announcements to assess the importance of attempts by 
regulators to increase the quality of information available to investors. We then compare 
fundamental characteristics of pre- and post-2011 Chinese firm US offerings to provide evidence 
of differences in firm quality before and after the market failure. We also compare the proportion 
of fraudulent firms before and after the market failure to assess the impact of regulatory 
intervention. Finally, we show that two new measures, North American Sales and US Education, 
provide a bond to US investors as a mechanism to overcome the problem of legal protection in 
this market.  
3.2 Sample 
Table 1 Panel A describes the sources of our sample firms up to December 31, 2014. We 
compile the US listed Chinese companies from three different sources: (1) WIND database 
provided by Wind Information Co., Ltd — a leading service provider of financial data in China; 
(2) CV Source database provided by ChinaVenture who is a leading investment consulting firm 
in China; and (3) Compustat. We identify 316 firms listed on US markets by December 31, 2011 
and 25 newly listed between 2012 and 2014. We exclude 19 cross-listed firms, 4 non-Chinese 
firms, 9 firms from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, 2 Chinese funds, and 3 Special Purpose 
Acquisition Companies (SPACs) after reviewing corporate profiles for firms listed prior to 2012. 
As a result, our final sample consists of 279 US listed Chinese companies that went public from 
                                                   
11 The entrepreneur posts a bond from North American sales because damages in a successful lawsuit can be 
enforced by court order from local affiliates of the Chinese firm. The US executive’s education may proxy for 
ownership of US assets or residence status. 
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1994 to 2011, and 25 firms newly listed from 2012 to 2014.  
We hand-collect information on whether the Chinese firm is listed through the IPO process 
(F-1 or prospectus) or a reverse merger transaction.12 We identify 140 firms entering the US 
market through the IPO process and 139 firms entering through a reverse merger between 1994 
and 2011, 25 typical IPOs and 1 listing without equity offering between 2012 and 2014.13 
Financial data and stock returns are extracted from the Compustat and CRSP databases. We 
hand-collect governance characteristics, ownership structure, auditor and underwriter identity, 
offering price and gross proceeds in the listing year from SEC filings. Our analysis shows that 
the sample firms from 1994 to 2011 have a listing date market capitalization of $136.52 billion, 
among which IPO firms represent 83% ($113.52 billion) of the total market capitalization, while 
the sample firms from 2012 to 2014 have a listing date market capitalization of $36.05 billion. 
These results suggest that there has been and continues to be demand by US investors for 
Chinese firms in US markets.  
Table 1 Panel B indicates that 41% (115 firms) adopt the variable interest entity (VIE) 
structure for all listings prior to 2012, and 59% (83 out of 140 firms) for IPOs prior to 2012. 
After 2012, 24 out of 25 (96%) IPO firms use the VIE structure. The abundance of VIE use over 
the entire sample period suggests a willingness of owners to finesse both Chinese and US 
regulators with these controversial structures. The recent evidence highlights the dominance of 
Chinese IPO firms (no reverse mergers) with a VIE structure in the most recent period, 
suggesting elimination of the highly risky reverse mergers but a concentration of new firms with 
                                                   
12 The NYSE and Nasdaq published a list of 84 Chinese reverse mergers. For the remainder of our sample, we 
either review Form 8-K Item 5.06 or read through corporate history in their annual reports to identify reverse 
mergers. 
13China Mobile Games & Entertainment Group (CMGE) filed an F-1 on August 20, 2012 and stated that its parent 
company VODone who owned 64% of the firm would distribute an ADS to VODone’s shareholders and list it on a 
US stock exchange. There was no equity offering. The firm was listed on Nasdaq Global Market on September 21, 
2012. 
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limited opportunity to perfect property rights in a court of law.  
(Insert Table 1 here) 
Table 2 compares US listed Chinese firms with firms listed in China and Hong Kong. The 
Hong Kong IPO market is the largest for Chinese firms listing overseas and the US IPO market 
is the next largest. The number of IPOs by Chinese firms in the US market peaks in 2010, and 
their proceeds were slightly higher than 10 percent of total IPO proceeds in the US market. By 
2011, the number of US listed Chinese IPO firms had dropped to 10, compared to a robust 65 
IPOs in Hong Kong. By 2012 there were 61 offerings by Chinese firms in Hong Kong, and 
offerings in the US market decreased dramatically to only 2. In addition, the Chinese firm global 
IPO proceeds increased 150 percent from $2.15 billion in 2010 to $5.32 billion in 2012 in Hong 
Kong but dropped an astounding 96 percent from $4.19 billion in 2010 to $0.15 and $0.80 billion 
in 2012 and 2013 in the US market. These results suggest that the Chinese firm accounting 
irregularities seriously damaged the US IPO market for Chinese firms by 2012.14 In 2013 and 
2014, the Chinese firm US IPO market reemerged with $26.17 billion in proceeds from 23 IPOs, 
which includes $21.77 billion for Alibaba’s offering and $4.4 billion for the remaining 22 IPOs. 
In the next section, we analyze the US Chinese equity market prior to 2012.     
(Insert Table 2 here) 
4. THE MARKET MECHANISM AND QUALITY UNCERTAINTY 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics   
Panel A of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for our sample in their listing year for the 
firms going public before 2012. 41 percent of the firms adopt the VIE structure to control their 
operations in China, whereas 50 percent are IPO firms. Firms on average are 8 years old on the 
                                                   
14 Chinese regulator (CSRC) stopped approving any domestic IPO applications on October 11, 2012 and asked all 
IPO applicants to self-review the financial information of the firms. This regulatory process lasted 15 months. 
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listing date, and have $141.8 million total assets and low leverage of 29 percent. The firms are 
profitable and growing business enterprises in the listing year, with 7.1 percent ROA, and 95.9 
percent sales growth (Growth).15 Only 14.4 percent of firms have losses (Loss) in the listing year. 
Operating cash flow as a percentage of assets (CFO) has a positive mean of 0.059, indicating that 
sample firms generate positive net cash flows from their operating activities. The sample firms 
have low total accruals of 1.6 percent of total assets. While only 48 percent of the firms are 
audited by Big 4 auditor affiliates (Big4 AFF), most of the IPO firms (86 percent) hire Big4 
AFFs. 16 percent of the firms have a non-standard audit opinion in the listing year. The firms 
have a mean market-to-book ratio (MB) of 3.87, and a mean Price/EBIT of 23.34. The average 
stock holdings by institutional investors (TIO) are 6.6 percent of outstanding common shares at 
the end of the listing quarter.  
On average, these firms have negative cumulative abnormal returns after the listing date of 
-0.029, -0.206, and -0.163 for a 1-year, 2-year, and 3-year period respectively. The mean of 
volatility (standard deviation of daily stock return) is 0.055 during the 3-year period after the 
listing. Their average trading volume is 1.8% of total outstanding shares (turnover) during the 
3-year period after the listing. 
Overall, the sample descriptive statistics suggest that Chinese firms listing in the US 
appear to be established, profitable, and exhibit typical control mechanisms except for an 
unusually high proportion of firms adopting the VIE structure.  
(Insert Table 3 here) 
We further investigate whether US listed Chinese IPO firms before 2012 are comparable 
with their peer US IPO firms. For each sample year, we identify new US IPO firms from the 
                                                   
15 Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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SDC database and compare them with our Chinese IPO firms. Panel B of Table 3 shows that 
Chinese IPO firms are systematically more profitable and less risky than US IPO firms. First, 
Chinese IPO firms are younger but less underpriced. They appear to have greater return on assets 
and operating cash flows, fewer losses, and more unqualified auditor’s opinions than US firms. 
Chinese firms also exhibit larger size, lower leverage, and smaller market-to-book ratio than US 
firms, consistent with lower risk. Moreover, there is no difference in the likelihood of hiring a 
large multinational auditing firm comparing Chinese and US IPO firms.16 Finally, Chinese IPO 
firms have similar post-IPO stock performance and volatility to US IPO firms, but higher 
turnover rate. We further examine the survival rates three years after listing. Untabulated results 
show that, on average, Chinese firms listed in the US have similar survival rates to other US 
firms. After three years, 78 percent of Chinese firms and 76 percent of US IPOs survive. These 
descriptive statistics provide little evidence to suggest fundamental problems with these firms. 
4.2 Market Failure 
Several short sellers began publishing negative reports on Chinese firms listed in the US in 
2011. On April 26, 2011, Citron Research accused Longtop, a NYSE listed firm, of falsely 
claiming substantial sales and cash. The accusation of Longtop’s financial fraud proved to be 
accurate and Longtop became the first Chinese company delisted on a major US exchange. 
Numerous allegations of Chinese firm financial improprieties surfaced following Citron 
Research’s Longtop report. These salient cases attracted a great deal of attention from regulators, 
investors, and the media. Subsequently, a number of Chinese firms were investigated by the SEC, 
involved in class action lawsuits, or mentioned by major media. A long list of fraud types has 
                                                   
16 Although the IPOs are hiring multinational Big 4 firms, the Chinese IPOs are being audited by the local Big 4 
affiliates. This distinction is important because the PCAOB and SEC are unable to monitor auditing in China in the 
same fashion as in the US. See Section 2 Institutional Background for further discussion of this point. 
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been asserted by the SEC, investor class action lawsuits, or the media.17 The revelation of 
rampant financial fraud suggests there was substantial information asymmetry in the market for 
US listed Chinese firms.  
To give an evolutionary view of the market for Chinese firms listed in the US, we present 
the cumulative raw returns of all US listed Chinese firms for the period from January 2, 2009 to 
December 31, 2014. Figure 1 shows the market experienced a significant rise and fall capturing 
optimistic investor expectations in 2009 and a market collapse in 2011. The buy and hold raw 
return plummeted from 60 percent at the beginning of 2011 to negative 15 percent by the end of 
2011. The stock returns remain flat until the middle of 2013 and returned to 2009 levels by early 
2014 (3.9% at the beginning of May 2013 and 83.6% by the end of Feb. 2014). At the same time, 
the China Domestic Market Index (also plotted in Figure 1) does not show a significant declining 
trend. The precipitous decline in buy and hold returns and subsequent rebound suggest that the 
entire market for Chinese firms listed on US exchanges was impacted by a pervasive negative 
exogenous shock.  
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
For the sample firms that went public before the market disruption, we use three 
approaches to identify firms suspected of accounting fraud. First, we collect information on SEC 
litigation from the SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER) during 2000 to 
2012. Second, we identify class-action lawsuits from the Stanford Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse. Third, we search Lexis-Nexis for financial fraud or improper accounting practice 
alleged by the financial press or publicly published research reports. Panel A of Table 4 presents 
frequencies of fraud charges from each source (SEC, Class Action Lawsuit, and Media 
                                                   
17 The fraud charges include inflating revenue or assets, CEO theft, market manipulation, failure to disclose, related 
party transactions, GAAP violations, internal control deficiencies, and many more.  
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Accusation). 15 of 21 SEC enforcement actions (SEC) are reverse merger firms, while 6 are IPO 
firms. 82 firms are charged for accounting irregularities by either the SEC or shareholders (class 
action), among which are 50 reverse merger firms and 32 IPO firms. 65 reverse merger firms and 
54 IPO firms are suspected of wrongdoing by the SEC or shareholders or media accusations 
(media). These results show that a substantial proportion (43%) of our sample has elicited 
concern of financial reporting irregularities.  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
The market responded to these fraud accusations quite dramatically. Panel B of Table 4 
show the number of new listings, the number of merger & acquisition or privatizations, and the 
number of delistings from 1999 to 2014. The new listings drop dramatically from 71 in 2010 to 2 
in 2012. 37 firms were delisted by the end of 2011, which represents around 14.6% of active 
firms at the beginning of 2011. A further 22 firms were delisted in 2012. 
Table 4 Panel C presents cumulative abnormal returns, turnover, and IPO proceeds from 
1999 to 2014. While turnover shows a declining trend from 2007 until 2012, returns and IPO 
proceeds are very volatile. Turnover declined from .036 in 2004 to 0.010 in 2012, capturing a 
dramatic decline in liquidity by 2012. The market-adjusted abnormal returns for Chinese firms 
are -46.3% and -18.6% in 2011 and 2012, respectively. Only two Chinese firms tapped the 2012 
US IPO market with IPO proceeds of a mere 0.15 billion in total.18 The evidence shows that 
until 2013, the US market for Chinese firms exhibited diminished liquidity, a dramatic decline in 
returns, and precious few new IPOs after the revelation of extensive Chinese firm financial 
                                                   
18 After seven months since the last Chinese IPO in the US, Vipshop Holdings Limited (VIPS) went public on 
March 23, 2012 with an offering price of $6.50 and raised gross proceeds of $71.5 million, 40 percent less than its 
plan of $125 million.  Its stock price closed at $5.50 on the offering date on the NYSE, 15.38 percent below its IPO 
price. On November 21, 2012, YY Inc., went public in the US with an offering price of $10.50. Its first-day price 
closed at $11.31. The US market became so difficult for Chinese firms in the fall of 2012 that China Mobile Games 
and Entertainment Group Limited (CMGE) withdrew its equity offering plan and listed on Nasdaq on September 25, 
2012 without issuing new shares. Since CMGE did not issue any equity, we do not treat it as an IPO in our sample.   
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frauds.  
Information asymmetry in this market may result from Chinese entrepreneurs knowing 
their firm type while investors do not, or vice versa.19 Our first evidence determines the extent 
that investors can differentiate “good” versus “bad” firms since market prices should reflect the 
risk associated with either type of investment. Panel D of Table 4 compares the stock returns of 
Non-Lemons and Lemons based on our three categorizations (SEC, SEC + Class Action, & SEC 
+ Class Action + Media Accusation). Clearly, all three classes have similar negative and 
insignificantly different returns in 2011 and 2012. It is surprising that firms without an SEC 
Enforcement Action have worse returns (for example, -46.7% Non-SEC vs. -34.9% SEC in 2011) 
than firms with SEC Enforcement Action from 2010 to 2012, although the difference is 
statistically insignificant. Thus, investors did not appear to be able to separate Non-Lemons from 
Lemons. 
Our next series of tests investigate the events associated with the revelation of 
information concerning US listed Chinese firm frauds. In order to identify major information 
events for our sample, we calculate the three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for each 
trading date in 2010 and 2011. We then select the five dates with the most negative CAR. We 
identify related news events by reading Google Finance and Yahoo! Finance for the week 
surrounding each of these five dates. Panel A of Table 5 presents the three-day CAR for each 
date as well as identified news events. On June 2, 2011 and June 17, 2011, Muddy Waters 
Research and Citron issued negative research reports on Sino-Forest Corporation (a firm listed 
on the Toronto Stock Exchange) and Harbin Electric Inc. The entire US listed Chinese firm 
portfolio sank by 5.45% and 6.07% around these dates, respectively. On the other three event 
                                                   
19 Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch (1993) find that their results in IPO underpricing are consistent with the view 
that the market is better informed than the seller and the underwriter. 
20 
 
dates, articles by Reuters and the Wall Street Journal targeted a subset of the US listed Chinese 
firms, resulting in the portfolio return drop of more than 5%. The histogram in Panel B of Table 5 
shows that the majority of the US listed Chinese firms suffered from significantly negative 
returns when firm specific events 1 and 2 occurred. The two highest concentrations in the bins 
are categories [-10%, -5%] and [-5%, 0%] returns, consisting of 112 and 142 firm-events, 
respectively. Overall, the entire set of US listed Chinese firms appear to have suffered 
cumulative abnormal declines of approximately 5-6% for each of these five events. This 
evidence suggests that there is a substantial cost of dishonesty due to spillover effects for stock 
returns.  
(Insert Table 5 here) 
4.3 Market Mechanisms Limiting Fraud 
4.3.1 Audit Quality and Underwriter Reputation 
When quality uncertainty exists, certifying institutions are expected to evolve to mitigate 
the effect of this uncertainty. Guarantees, agents with reputation capital, and licensing are a few 
popular mechanisms for overcoming information asymmetry. In the US Chinese IPO firm market, 
auditors and underwriters may provide quality certification services. Auditors provide an opinion 
on the fairness of financial statements disclosures before and after the IPO. Similarly, reputable 
underwriters may screen out “bad” firms in the underwriting process. Thus, we examine whether 
audit quality or underwriter reputation signals US Chinese IPO firm quality.   
 Table 6 Panel A describes audit firm market shares of the Chinese IPO firms and their 
percentages of fraud firms.20 None of the firms audited by Ernst & Young Hua Ming or KPMG 
                                                   
20 Big 4 CPA firms are multinational auditors (Deloitte & Touche, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, KPMG, 
and Arthur Andersen & Co. ceased). Andersen & Co. ceased operations at the beginning of our sample period.  The 
Big 4 - Non Big 4 classification has been used as a proxy for audit quality.  
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Huazhen were subject to an SEC AAER. When comparing the fraud rate between Big 4 affiliates 
and Non Big 4 firms, we calculate the number-weighted average of fraud rate, i.e., the fraud rate 
is weighted by the number of firms audited by each accounting firm. Big 4 affiliate auditors have 
an average likelihood of 3.4 percent that their clients are subject to an SEC AAER, while 
non-Big 4 auditors have an average likelihood of 5.3 percent. Conversely, the other two fraud 
classifications show that firms with Big 4 affiliate auditors have a higher likelihood of fraud 
charges than those with non-Big 4 auditors, but the differences are statistically insignificant. The 
evidence suggests that Big 4 affiliates do not provide a better signal of firm quality.  
Table 6 Panel B presents evidence on how well underwriters provide certification to 
Chinese IPO firms. Panel B shows the number of firms underwritten by seven prestigious 
investment banks and the percentage of fraud firms in the IPO sample.21 The number-weighted 
average comparison shows that prestigious underwriters have either approximately the same or a 
higher percentage of fraud firms than other underwriters. As in the case of auditor certification, 
the underwriter screening mechanism fails to identify Lemons.  
(Insert Table 6 here) 
4.3.2 Institutional Investors 
Institutional investors are generally viewed as the most likely to be efficient producers of 
publicly available data and have incentives for private information search. Thus, we investigate 
the propensity of institutional investors to own Chinese firms listed in the US. If institutional 
investors are capable of using public or private information to identify firms that subsequently 
are the subject of accounting irregularities, one would expect them to avoid investing in these 
problematic firms. If institutional investors are unable to differentiate Non-Lemons from Lemons, 
                                                   
21 For each IPO lead underwriter, we obtain prestige rankings from Ritter's website, based on Loughran and Ritter 
(2004). 
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it is likely that there is substantial information asymmetry even among sophisticated investors. 
We use quarterly data to analyze how institutional holdings change after the firms listing 
dates. Panel A of Table 7 compares institutional holdings of Non-Lemons and Lemons at the end 
of the five quarters following the public offerings from 1994 to 2011. From the first quarter to 
the fifth quarter, there is no significant difference in institutional holdings between firms charged 
by the SEC and other firms. Firms subject to class actions have significantly higher institutional 
ownership than other firms from the fourth quarter to the fifth quarter after the listing date, and 
this result continues in the fifth quarter under our third classification of “bad” firms. Importantly, 
we observe that institutional investors are “loading up” on these firms and increasing their 
proportionate share to a greater degree in firms that ultimately became a problem. The fact that 
they are net buyers of these firms over time is inconsistent with institutional investors possessing 
superior information. 
We further examine institutional trading around the IPO firm lockup expiration dates. If an 
institutional investor has private information about a fraud firm she owned prior to the IPO, we 
expect her to sell more immediately after the lockup expiration. We compare the buy and sell 
order imbalance of institutional investors in the different windows around expiration of the 
lockup period.22 We find that institutional investors buy more stocks of Lemons (SEC or Action), 
but sell more stocks of other firms after the lockup expiration. For instance, as shown in Table 7 
Panel B, within the month of the lockup expiration date, the order imbalance for other firms is 
-9.53% compared to 16.2% for Action. These findings are consistent with the quarterly trading 
results in Panel A of Table 7, suggesting that institutional investors do not appear to have access 
to private information. 
                                                   
22 Field and Hanka (2001) and Brav and Gompers (2003) find that stock prices fall in the week that lockup expires.  
We obtain institutional daily trading data for the period from January 2000 to December 2011 from Ancerno Inc., a 
private data provider. Order imbalance is the difference between buy and sell volume divided by their sum.  
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(Insert Table 7 here) 
4.3.3 Regression Analysis of Market Mechanisms 
Next, we compare fundamental characteristics of “good” and “bad” firms. We expect that 
Lemons would be penalized in a well-functioning capital market if they could be easily separated 
from Non-Lemons. Thus, Lemons would have strong incentives to mimic all aspects of the 
Non-Lemons in hopes of being pooled with them. We estimate probit regressions to determine 
whether the fundamental characteristics in the listing year are significant in predicting fraud 
charges. Our dependent variables are the three indicator measures of fraud charges: SEC, Action, 
and Charge. The firms without a SEC AAER, class action lawsuit, or media accusation are 
considered “good” firms, with a value of “1” assigned to each indicator.  
We follow prior literature (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1996 and Dechow, Ge, and 
Schrand 2010) considering size, leverage, performance measures (ROA, Growth, and Loss), 
market to book (MB), and total accruals (Accruals) as differentiators of firm quality. Audit 
quality measures (Big4AFF and Opinion indicators) and an institutional ownership measure (TIO) 
(Bushee 1998 and Hartzell and Starks, 2003) are included as additional explanatory variables. 
Since IPO firms are almost surely more carefully scrutinized than reverse merger firms, we 
include an IPO indicator. We also analyze the impact of the VIE structure on fraud charges. 
Finally, we control for listing year and industry indicators in our probit models.  
Table 8 provides the regression results. Columns (1) - (3) measure fraud charges during 
2000 to 2012, and column (4) - (6) measures fraud charges within 3 years after a listing. Table 8 
shows that IPO firms are less likely to be charged by the SEC, sued by shareholders and accused 
of accounting fraud by the media. The five positive coefficients on the size variable suggest that 
larger firms are more likely to be targeted. Leverage is negatively associated with all three 
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measures of fraud charges, suggesting that firms with higher leverage are less likely to face fraud 
accusations. Our results suggest that creditors may have a monitoring role for Chinese firms 
listed in the US.  
In addition, an audit opinion other than a standard unqualified opinion significantly 
increases the likelihood of fraud charges. But hiring a prestigious auditor (Big 4 Affiliate) has no 
impact on the likelihood of fraud charges. The results suggest that auditor identity does not play 
a major role in the decision by the SEC, lawyers, or reporters to pursue allegations of wrong 
doing.   
Even though the VIE structure may impose firm regulatory and accounting risks, firms 
with the VIE structure are not more likely to face ex post scrutiny. The coefficients on the VIE 
indicator are not statistically significant across all models. Similarly, neither our proxy for 
earnings quality (Accruals) nor the institutional ownership measure (TIO) is significantly related 
to charges.  
On balance, the multivariate analysis confirms the univariate test results in that there are 
few consistent conventional signals that investors can rely upon to detect accounting frauds in 
the US listed Chinese firms.23 
(Insert Table 8 here) 
4.3.4 Privatizations by Chinese Firms 
Our next set of tests address the question of Chinese entrepreneurs’ knowledge of their 
firm type. We examine whether Non-Lemons seek to exit the US market. Table 9 presents the 
comparison between privatized firms and others. We define “P” as the 46 firms that successfully 
privatized by the end of 2014 and “NP” as the other 233 firms. Table 9 shows that only one 
                                                   
23 We used financial data in the year before the listing year and the year before the revelation of massive frauds 
(2010). We also analyzed using the restated earnings from the Audit Analytics for 16 firms in our sample with 
earnings restatements later. Our findings are robust to these alternative financial statement measures.    
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successfully-privatized firm is the subject of a SEC AAER, compared to 8.6 percent of 
non-privatized firms that are facing an SEC AAER. Similarly, privatized firms are significantly 
less likely to be charged by shareholders and media accusations. Privatized firms are more likely 
to be IPO firms, have larger assets, and have lower sales growth and market-to-book ratio in their 
listing year, consistent with the privatization firms being Non-Lemons. On balance, there is 
relatively little evidence of differences in other fundamental characteristics between privatized 
and other firms.  
Untabulated results show that entrepreneurs are willing to pay a substantial premium to 
exit the market. On average, the premium - the difference between the offer price and the stock 
price at the privatization announcement day is 37.3%. This evidence suggests that quality 
uncertainty causes these firms to be traded at a price with close to a 40% discount. These results 
are also consistent with “good” firms exiting the US market by undertaking a costly privatization 
transaction. Our findings support the view that the costs of dishonesty in markets include the loss 
incurred from driving legitimate businesses out of existence.  
(Insert Table 9 here) 
In sum, the evidence presented in this section suggests substantial information asymmetry 
between investors and entrepreneurs. While investors cannot infer firm types or preemptively 
react to Non-Lemons and Lemons, entrepreneurs appear to know their firm types.  
5. Regulatory Intervention and Reemergence of the Market  
5.1 Spillover to China Stock Market? 
We investigate whether the 2011 market failure is unique to the Chinese firms listed in the 
US but not to those listed in the Chinese domestic market. If Chinese investors suffer from the 
same type of information asymmetry and domestic regulations in China do not function well, the 
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spillover effect documented in the previous section may travel across the Pacific.  
First, we observe that Chinese investors did not respond significantly to the firm specific 
events, while they responded to revelation of possible regulatory intervention. Specifically, the 
Chinese market returns in days (-1,+1) associated with the five events in Table 5 are -0.82%, 
-1.18%, -1.62%, -1.86%, and -0.92%, respectively. They are all negative but only significant for 
Event 3 (the announcement of the SEC’s intention to regulate reverse mergers) and Event 4 
(CRSC recommendation of cancelling the VIE structure). The evidence suggests that Chinese 
investors were less surprised by the magnitude of Lemons among Chinese firms listed in the US 
and they did not add the same discount to firms traded in China.  
We further examine how Chinese investors responded to the 10 firms cross-listed in the US 
and China which are excluded from our final sample. Our analysis shows that CAR (-1,+1) in the 
US market associated with the five events are 1.22%, -1.19%, 0.13%, -2.75%, and -3.49%, 
respectively, suggesting that cross-listed firms are only affected by general events such as events 
4 and 5. Meanwhile, CAR (-1,+1) in the Chinese market associated with the five events are 
-0.27%, -0.48%, 0.38%, 1.24%, and 0.44%, respectively. The evidence supports the argument 
that the spillover effect is primarily concentrated in the US market, indicating a barrier of 
information search across borders and the lack of regulatory oversight in the US.  
5.2 Regulatory Actions Across Borders 
  Our previous tests are consistent with a market failure. Traditional market mechanisms 
such as auditor quality and underwriter reputation provide limited assurance regarding the 
quality of firms. Clearly, the fact that the firms are located in one country, possibly domiciled in 
a second country, and the investors reside in a third country demands robust information 
channels between entrepreneurs, regulators, and investors. However, issues of differing legal 
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systems, international treaties, and sovereignty introduce stumbling blocks which exacerbate 
asymmetric information problems in this market.  
We now turn our attention to the effect of legal protection and regulations. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) suggest that effective legal protection is necessary for a well-functioning market. 
Since China does not regulate Chinese firms listed in the US and the SEC enforcement actions as 
well as US court’s rulings are not enforced in China, ex post settling up costs from fraudulent 
reporting by Chinese firms are lower than for a typical domestic registrant. This lack of US 
regulatory and court enforcement power enhances the incentive for Chinese firms to provide 
lower quality and even misleading financial information. Without cooperation between Chinese 
and US regulators, investors will rationally price protect against incentives by Chinese firms to 
provide fraudulent financial reports. We investigate the effect of regulatory protection by 
documenting market price reactions to information concerning US and China regulators efforts 
to cooperate.  
We search Lexis-Nexis to identify regulatory initiatives between the US and China over 
US listed Chinese firms. Our search begins in July 2011, after the start of the market disruption, 
and ends at the end of 2014. Panel A of Table 10 identifies 12 events addressing attempts at 
regulatory coordination and Panel B reports value-weighted raw and abnormal returns for US 
listed Chinese firms around these regulatory events.  
The PCAOB announced on July 6, 2011 that a joint PCAOB and SEC delegation would 
meet the following week in Beijing with representatives from China's Ministry of Finance and 
the CSRC. The meeting was regarded as the opportunity to initiate a cooperative resolution to 
cross-border auditing oversight by James R. Doty, PCAOB Chairman. The abnormal return 
around the announcement is +2.6%, suggesting that investors had positive expectation for 
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US-China cooperation. According to the joint-press release on Aug. 8, 2011, however, “The 
Sino-US Symposium on Audit Oversight” did not reach any agreement on specific cooperation 
actions on audit oversight and resulted in an abnormal return of -3.8%. 
Negative abnormal returns are also observed for US regulatory actions against US listed 
Chinese firms. In response to the large number of fraud charges against US listed Chinese firms, 
the PCAOB issued Staff Audit Practice Alert No. 8 - Audit Risks In Certain Emerging Markets 
on Oct. 3, 2011 (Event 3). The abnormal return for 1994 to 2011 listings was -5% around the 
alert. Somewhat surprisingly, there was no market reaction for Event 9 when the SEC filed 
litigation against the Chinese Affiliates of the global auditing firms for their refusal to cooperate 
on demands for access to audit working papers. On January 22, 2014, SEC Administrative Law 
Judge Cameron Elliot found that the Chinese affiliates of Ernst & Young, KPMG, Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and BDO, violated provisions of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act. Judge Elliot’s ruling censured and denied them the privilege of practicing before the SEC 
for a period of six months. This decision would effectively limit the affiliates of global CPA 
firms from auditing Chinese firms seeking equity capital in the US or any other audit of Chinese 
subsidiaries of US registrants.24 This ruling (Event 11) caused abnormal returns of US listed 
Chinese firms of -5.1%. 
Cross-border oversight largely depends on the willingness of Chinese regulators to permit 
access to information about Chinese firms to US regulators. A Reuters report on Oct. 19, 2011 
stated that Chinese regulators asked the Chinese affiliates of the Big 4 and two smaller audit 
                                                   
24 The judge’s decision describes a number of cases with the Chinese affiliate of the global auditing firm being hired 
to investigate fraud or misrepresentation. The Chinese affiliate finds itself unable to turn over working papers to US 
regulators because of Chinese law. Thus, the auditing firm faces a classic dilemma because of conflicting laws in the 
US and China. 
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firms to urgently review their work on US listed Chinese companies and give details of any 
information they may have provided to overseas regulators. The emphasis on confidentiality 
rules by Chinese authorities ratcheted up tensions between US and Chinese regulators on audit 
oversight. The abnormal return of this event (Event 4) is -2%. In an interview dated May 8, 2012, 
the chairman of the PCAOB said “we ought to be able to observe the inspections they conduct in 
the late summer or fall, and certainly by the end of the year.” This statement captures the lack of 
progress in securing an agreement with Chinese regulators to assure oversight of information 
production (Event 5) resulting in a -1.2% abnormal return. On Oct. 5, 2012, China and the US 
reached an audit inspection agreement that allows US regulators to observe official auditor 
inspections in China (Event 7). The investors, however, showed no significant reaction to this 
agreement, showing their reservation. But the abnormal return of +1.7% around Event 8 suggests 
that investors reacted positively to the news that for the first time, US officials completed a round 
of observations of inspections of auditors in China, and it was expected that Chinese and US 
officials would discuss the access to audit documents by year-end . On May 24, 2013, China and 
the US signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), opening the door for US regulators to 
access documents held by Chinese auditors (Event 10). This MOU was designed to provide some 
structure for the relationship between US and China regulators that oversee audit firms, which 
have been involved in audits of the financial statements of Chinese firms that have been raising 
capital in the US. Surprisingly, there is no significant abnormal return around the MOU. On April 
21, 2014, China Ministry of Finance issued a draft of “Provisional Regulations on Cross-border 
Auditing Business of Accounting Firms” (Event 12). This draft provides the most definitive 
statement to date that the Chinese government intends to oversee auditing issues of overseas 
listings. This announcement resulted in a positive abnormal return of 1.8%. 
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To summarize, Table 10 shows that the market responded positively to events signaling 
increased cross-border oversight of US listed Chinese firms and negatively to events revealing 
no progress or unwillingness to coordinate. The mix of negative and positive market reactions 
indicates the difficulty the US and China faced in reaching an agreement. On balance, these 
results support the view that regulatory cooperation and protection of investor property rights is 
valued by market participants, but the present state of cross-border oversight is quite tenuous. 
(Insert Table 10 here) 
5.3 Reemergence of the Market 
As noted in the previous section, the cross-border coordination efforts have made some 
tenuous progress in re-establishing trust in the financial disclosures of Chinese firms seeking 
funding through the US equity market. Even though existing Chinese firms had no significant 
reaction to the May 5, 2013 MOU, it ended a 6-month quiet period for Chinese firm US IPOs. 
Since May 5, 2013, there have been a number of highly visible Chinese firm US offerings (8 
IPOs in 2013 and 15 in 2014, including Alibaba). We expect these new Chinese IPO firms to be 
similar to other well-known US firms. For example, Weibo and JD are quite similar to Twitter 
and Amazon, and Alibaba is a combination of Ebay and Paypal. In the post-MOU period, $26.17 
billion of IPO proceeds were raised for the Chinese US IPO firms, with the $21.77 billion IPO 
proceeds by Alibaba in 2014 as the largest IPO to date. Finally, Figure 1 shows the Chinese firm 
portfolio of sample firms that went public from 1994 to 2011 rebounded and increased 50% after 
the MOU and by the end of 2014. 
To assess the impact of regulatory intervention in this market, we compare fundamental 
characteristics of the Chinese firms going public in the US post 2011 with those of the firms pre 
2011. Table 11 (Columns 1 and 2) presents the results. There are a few notable differences: The 
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new IPOs are more likely to adopt the VIE structure and hire more prestigious underwriters 
although the degree of underpricing is similar. New IPOs are substantially bigger and have 
longer histories. Profitability for these firms are lower than pre-2011. For example, average ROA 
decreases from 6.7% to 2.1%, and the percentage of loss increases from 13.8% to 40.0%. 
Accruals change from positive (0.007) to negative (-0.077). The market responds more positively 
to the post-2011 IPOs. Institutional holdings by the end of IPO quarter are significantly higher 
for the new IPOs (26.7% vs. 7%). These significant differences suggest that regulatory 
intervention has impacted the composition of Chinese firms electing to list in US capital markets. 
   Furthermore, Table 11 presents these characteristics of alternative benchmarking groups – 
Non-Lemons Chinese IPO firms in 1994 to 2011 (Column 3) and US IPO firms in 2012 to 2014 
(Column 4). We compare the characteristics of new IPOs in 2012 to 2014 with Non-Lemon 
Chinese IPOs pre 2011. Unsurprisingly, all differences discussed in the previous paragraph 
remain. The t-values are reported in Column (1)-(3). When comparing new Chinese IPOs with 
US IPOs in the same period 2012 to 2014, there are many differences. Two notable differences 
are Age and ROA. While US IPOs have on average a 19.45 year history, Chinese new IPOs only 
have 8.21 year history although they are longer than pre-2011 Chinese IPOs (6.53 years). New 
Chinese IPOs are profitable while US IPOs lose money at the listing year (average ROA negative 
12.4%). The t-values for the difference tests are reported in Column (1)-(4).     
(Insert Table 11 here) 
One may expect that these 25 new IPOs should be carefully selected after the market 
reemerged from the failure. Surprisingly, some firms are still involved in class action lawsuits. 
Even though the 2012 to 2014 listings have no SEC AAER during 2013 to 2015, they have 9 
pending class action lawsuits. We examined each of these 9 cases for the reasons leading to law 
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suits, we find that new IPOs are still charged by investors for similar causes such as failure of 
disclosure and providing misstated financial conditions. These instances suggest that after going 
through market failure and benefiting from regulatory interventions, investors continue to seek 
Chinese firm exposure even though these firms are still the target of litigation at very high rates.  
5.4 Legal Protection for Truthful Reporting  
While traditional market mechanisms such as audit quality and underwriter’s reputation 
fail, we turn our attention to our proxies for legal protection. Fines and civil lawsuit penalties 
imposed by the SEC or US Courts are more easily collected from the Chinese firms’ US 
subsidiary that operate in the US product market. Thus, if misconduct is discovered, the potential 
cost is higher for a Chinese firm with US operations. Similarly, we investigate whether a CEO’s 
US educational background is related to prevention of fraud. CEO US education may be 
correlated with the residence status (PR or citizenship) or property ownership, so it may be a 
good proxy for legal protection. We expect that firms with US operations and CEOs with US 
educational background are less likely to engage in accounting frauds.  
We construct a variable to proxy for product penetration in North America market (NA 
Sales) from Compustat segment data. NA Sales is the percentage of sales revenue from North 
America in the listing year divided by the total revenue. We identify CEO educational 
background from the CEO’s biography and construct an indicator variable (USEducation), equal 
to “1” if the CEO received degree(s) from US institutions.  
We add NA Sales and US Education as two new variables in regressions featured in Table 
8. For brevity, we only report the results for the two new variables in Table 12 because the 
coefficients for other variables are similar to those reported in Table 8. Our results indicate that 
CEO’s US education significantly reduced the likelihood of accounting fraud in Chinese firms. 
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The coefficients on NA Sales are negative and significant in probit regressions in column (3) and 
(9), supporting the notion that operations in North America reduces the likelihood of accounting 
frauds in Chinese firms listed in the US when frauds are defined as media accusations. The 
evidence shows that the degree of legal protection proxied by North America sales and CEO’s 
US education is associated with the lower likelihood of financial frauds. This implies that legal 
protection is an important substitute for ineffective cross border regulation.  
 (Insert Table 12 here) 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 Prior literature in economics largely studies information asymmetry in well-functioning 
markets. For markets with severe information asymmetry and frictions, market failure is a 
possibility. This outcome is rarely observed because diligent information searches can mitigate 
information asymmetry and market mechanisms may prevent market failure. However, we 
document an exception to the norm. A number of Chinese firms elected to enter the US capital 
market over the last two decades. Unique governance structures, information environments, 
regulation, and legal systems impacting Chinese firms impose significant challenges for US 
investors in collecting and processing information.  
  The revelation of fraud for a substantial proportion of US listed Chinese firms in 2011 
precipitated significant market return losses, decreased liquidity, and a cessation of Chinese firm 
US IPOs. We hypothesize and test whether a market failure occurred. Our tests reveal the 
existence of severe information asymmetry between investors and entrepreneurs and a resulting 
market collapse. We find little evidence that traditional market mechanisms such as auditor 
quality and underwriter reputation provide credible signals of firm quality. We find that 
firm-specific factors capturing the degree of legal protection, such as North America sales and 
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CEO’s US education, are less likely to be associated with financial frauds.  
 Chinese and US regulators reacted to this market failure with a series regulatory initiatives 
to alleviate the conditions that led to this market turmoil. Both countries agreed to an information 
sharing agreement that provides a mechanism for the US to request access to Chinese audit firm 
work papers. However, the mechanism is cumbersome and information sharing is not assured. 
Furthermore, the agreement has a five-year statute of limitations. Responding to these regulatory 
actions, the IPO market for Chinese firms listed in US has returned in the past few years. 
However, fundamental protections of property rights for investors in US listed firms have not 
been assured by the recent regulatory interventions. This level of investor protection would 
require mechanisms to assure the ability to determine culpability and loss recovery across 
national boundaries. With this level of legal protection for property rights and regulatory 
cooperation, one would expect the US Chinese firm market to become a robust market attracting 
Chinese entrepreneurs seeking capital in the US. However, the problems of assuring property 
rights, high quality information, and legal recourse that led to the 2011 market failure have not 
been substantially changed as shown in our analysis. Thus, the US Chinese firm market is likely 
to remain as a fragile and high risk segment of the US securities market.    
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Appendix 1  
Variable Definition 
Accruals Total accruals divided by ending total assets in listing year 
Action 
Indicator variable, 1 if a firm faces either SEC litigation or class action regarding 
accounting issues during 2000-2012 
Age 
Number of years that a firm was established by the time of its listing, natural log is 
used in regressions 
Big4 AFF 
Indicator variable, 1 if a firm hires a “Big4 Affiliate” as its auditor in listing year, 
otherwise 0  
BM 
Book-to-market ratio in listing year, calculated by book value of common 
shareholder’s equity divided by market capitalization of common stocks at the end of 
fiscal year 
CAR 
Cumulative abnormal returns, defined as the difference between raw returns and 
value-weighted market returns 
CFO Net operating cash flows divided by ending total assets in listing year 
Charge 
Indicator variable, 1 if a firm faces any charge from SEC or shareholder during 
2000-2012 or media during 2009-2012 
EBIT/Price 
Earnings before interest and tax per share deflated by stock price per share at the end 
of fiscal year 
Growth 
Sales growth in listing year, defined as the percentage change in sales from the lag 
year to the current year 
IB Rank 
Rankings of lead underwriters, use average rankings if there is more than one lead 
underwriter; prestige rankings are obtained from Jay Ritter’s website 
IPO Indicator variable, 1 if a firm is listed through regular IPO process, otherwise 0 
Leverage Total liabilities divided by ending total assets in listing year 
Loss Indicator variable, 1 if a firm has negative net income, otherwise 0 
Opinion 
Indicator variable, 1 if a firm gets audit opinion other than standard unqualified 
opinion in listing year, otherwise 0 
NA Sales The percentage of sales from North America over the total revenue in the listing year  
Proceeds Offering price multiplied by shares offered during the IPO, in $million 
ROA 
Return on assets in listing year, calculated by net income deflated by ending total 
assets 
ROE 
Return on equity in listing year, calculated by net income deflated by ending common 
shareholder's equity 
SEC 
Indicator variable, 1 if a firm faces any SEC litigation regarding accounting issues 
during 2000-2012 
Size Natural log of total assets in listing year 
TIO 
Ownership by institutional investors at the end of the quarter in which a firm gets 
listed, deflated by outstanding common shares  
Turnover The average of trading volume divided by shares outstanding 
USEducation Indicator variable, 1 if CEO studied in US universities and institutions, otherwise zero 
VIE 
Indicator variable, 1 if a firm uses variable interest entities for its operations in China, 
otherwise 0 
Volatility Standard deviation of daily stock returns 
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Table 1 Sample Selection and Characteristics 
 
Panel A. Sample selection 
US-listed Chinese firms 1994-2011 2012-2014 
WIND & CV Source 312 25 
Compustat additions 4  
 Initial Sample 316  
Exclude: 
 
 
  a. Cross-listing firms 19  
  b. Non-Chinese Firms 4  
  c. Firms from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan  9  
  d. Funds 2  
  e. Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) 3  
Sub-total 279 25 
 
Panel B. Sample composition 
  IPO 
Reverse 
Merger/Other 
VIE Structure Non-VIE Structure 
1994-2011 140 139 115 164 
2012-2014 25 1 24 2 
Total 165 140 139 166 
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Table 2  
Distribution of Sample Firms in Three Different Markets 
This table presents the number and proceeds of Chinese IPOs in three different markets. US IPO and Hong 
Kong IPO data are obtained from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Global New Issues database. IPOs in 
China are obtained from WIND dataset. We exclude IPOs with an offer price of less than $1, Unit offerings, 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) offerings, funds, and cross-listing offerings. Proceeds are in $billions. 
 
  Listed in China Listed in US  Listed Hong Kong 
Year N Proceeds N Proceeds 
% of IPO 
proceeds 
N Proceeds 
% of IPO 
proceeds 
1999 94 6.17 2 0.09 0.15 4 0.06 14.2 
2000 145 10.37 6 0.53 0.94 2 0.17 11.9 
2001 64 6.71 0 0 0 4 0.16 26.1 
2002 71 6.25 0 0 0 15 0.23 11.9 
2003 66 5.48 1 0.08 0.7 17 1.17 66.9 
2004 98 4.27 10 2.65 7.0 28 1.73 65.0 
2005 15 0.71 9 1.74 5.4 23 2.77 60.5 
2006 71 21.04 10 2.15 5.3 23 3.72 84.0 
2007 121 61.19 30 8.28 17.7 35 9.14 59.2 
2008 77 15.13 6 0.3 1.2 16 0.5 29.2 
2009 111 29.62 12 1.94 12.7 37 3.58 45.5 
2010 347 74.19 40 4.19 10.9 45 2.15 9.40 
2011 277 43.07 10 1.86 5.3 65 4.89 38.7 
2012 150 15.83 2 0.15 0.4 61 5.32 94.8 
2013 0 0 8 0.80 1.4 8 11.86 54.05 
2014 125 10.79 15 25.37 52.8 30 15.88 55.23 
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics in Listing Year 
The table compares firm characteristics in the listing year among US listed Chinese firms and other US IPO 
firms during 1994-2011. We exclude ADRs, unit offers, closed-end funds, REITs, IPOs with an offer price 
lower than $1.00, IPOs in financial industries (SIC code in 6000s), and IPOs not covered by CRSP and/or 
Compustat. Variable definition is provided in Appendix 1. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, 
and 1% respectively.  
 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics for sample firms listed between 1994 and 2011 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
Offering Structure     
IPO 0.50 0.50 0 1 1 
VIE 0.41 0.49 0 0 1 
Size and Leverage of the Offering    
Size 18.77 0.98 18.22 18.76 19.40 
Leverage 0.290 0.194 0.125 0.243 0.426 
Age 8.08 4.32 5 7.25 10.58 
Profitability      
ROA 0.071 0.204 0.046 0.095 0.148 
Growth 0.959 1.412 0.293 0.536 1.038 
Accruals 0.016 0.179 -0.049 0.016 0.1 
Loss 0.144 0.352 0 0 0 
CFO 0.059 0.15 -0.022 0.069 0.139 
Monitors, Opinion, and Valuation Metrics    
Big4 AFF 0.48 0.50 0 0 1 
Opinion 0.159 0.366 0 0 0 
MB 3.87  3.86  1.57 2.73 4.76 
Price/EBIT 23.34  63.84  5.14 11.46 31.10 
TIO 0.066 0.102 0 0.022 0.093 
Stock performance     
1-year CAR -0.029 0.981 -0.632 -0.154 0.326 
2-year CAR -0.206 1.138 -0.925 -0.373 0.288 
3-year CAR -0.163 1.404 -1.067 -0.337 0.389 
1-year volatility 0.055  0.037  0.037  0.046  0.061  
2-year volatility 0.055  0.034  0.038  0.047  0.064  
3-year volatility 0.054  0.032  0.039  0.047  0.061  
1-year turnover 0.022 0.038 0.004 0.009 0.025 
2-year turnover 0.018 0.029 0.004 0.010 0.019 
3-year turnover 0.018 0.029 0.005 0.010 0.017 
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Panel B. Comparisons of Chinese IPOs and US IPOs between 1994 and 2011 
Variable Chinese IPOs US IPOs T-test 
Offering    
Age 6.63 15.10 -4.54*** 
Underpricing 0.198 0.329 -2.52** 
Size and Leverage of the Offering  
Size 19.19 18.72 3.63*** 
Leverage 0.240 0.371 -8.59*** 
Profitability    
ROA 0.067 -0.116 13.14*** 
Growth 1.025 1.930 -5.96*** 
Accruals 0.007 -0.062 5.55*** 
Loss 0.138 0.520 -12.10*** 
CFO 0.060 -0.051 8.17*** 
Monitors, Opinion, and Valuation Metrics  
Big4 AFF / Big4 0.86 0.89 -1.34 
Opinion 0.138 0.220 -2.63*** 
MB 4.032 7.342 -3.98*** 
Price/EBIT 36.656 17.240 1.38 
Stock performance    
1-year CAR -0.178  -0.090  -1.29 
2-year CAR -0.304  -0.226  -0.86 
3-year CAR -0.133  -0.238  1.16 
1-year volatility 0.050  0.050  0.09 
2-year volatility 0.050  0.052  -1.10  
3-year volatility 0.049  0.053  -1.81* 
1-year turnover 0.036  0.009  6.26*** 
2-year turnover 0.028  0.009  5.85*** 
3-year turnover 0.027  0.009  5.48*** 
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Table 4 Fraud Charges and Market Performance of Chinese Firms Listed in US during 1994-2011 
Panel A defines the three classes of bad firms: (1) Classification 1 - firms are subject to SEC litigation (SEC) 
during 2000-2012; (2) Classification 2 - firms are subject to class action or SEC litigation (Action) during 
2000-2012; (3) Classification 3 - firms are accused by the SEC or shareholders or major US media (Charge) 
during 2009-2012. Panel B summarizes the evolution of the market for Chinese Firms Listed in the US from 
1999-2014. Panel C shows stock returns, turnover, and change in IPO proceeds for Chinese firms listed in 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. Market adjusted CAR is the difference between the cumulative return of each 
stock and the equal-weighted market returns. The portfolio rebalances when a firm is added or dropped from 
the sample. Turnover is the average of each stock’s turnover which equals to daily trading volume divided by 
shares outstanding. Panel D compares the stock returns of “bad” and “good” firms in 2009-2012. 
 
Panel A. Frequency of fraud charges 
 
Reverse mergers IPOs Total 
SEC AAER (2000-2012) 15 6 21 
Either SEC AAER or Class Action (2000-2012) 50 32 82 
SEC AAER, Class Action or Media Accusation 65 54 119 
 
Panel B. Distribution of firm status 
Year 
# Stocks at 
Year Start 
New 
listings 
Privatization or 
M&A 
Delisted 
# Stocks by 
Year end 
1999 2 2 0 0 4 
2000 4 7 0 0 11 
2001 11 1 0 0 12 
2002 12 1 0 0 13 
2003 13 1 0 0 14 
2004 14 13 0 0 27 
2005 27 16 0 0 43 
2006 43 16 0 1 58 
2007 58 49 0 2 105 
2008 105 27 0 1 131 
2009 131 58 0 2 187 
2010 187 71 2 3 253 
2011 253 15 10 37 221 
2012 221 2 14 22 188 
2013 188 8 15 10 171 
2014 171 15 19 5 162 
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Panel C. Time series of the performance of Chinese portfolio based on old listings 
Year Market adj. 
CAR 
Volatility Turnover IPO proceeds 
($Billion)  
1999 1.263  0.143  0.014  0.09  
2000 -0.210  0.101  0.009  0.53  
2001 0.540  0.090  0.005  0.00  
2002 0.919  0.143  0.005  0.00  
2003 1.356  0.106  0.046  0.08  
2004 0.159  0.054  0.036  2.65  
2005 -0.159  0.039  0.026  1.74  
2006 0.243  0.043  0.024  2.15  
2007 0.260  0.048  0.031  8.28  
2008 -0.235  0.056  0.019  0.30  
2009 0.230  0.052  0.015  1.94  
2010 -0.265  0.038  0.014  4.19  
2011 -0.463  0.048  0.014  1.86  
2012 -0.186  0.050  0.010  0.15  
2013 0.416  0.048  0.018  0.80  
2014 -0.060  0.042  0.025  25.37  
 
Panel D. Market adjusted CAR for different subsamples of old listings in 2009-2012 
Year 
Listing type Classification 1 Classification 2 Classification 3 
IPO RM 
No SEC SEC No Action Action 
No 
Charge 
Charge 
2009 0.068 0.365 0.226 0.270 0.245 0.199 0.159 0.320 
2010 -0.188 -0.343 -0.270 -0.196 -0.252 -0.295 -0.321 -0.186 
2011 -0.378 -0.582 -0.467 -0.349 -0.460 -0.474 -0.464 -0.462 
2012 -0.143 -0.255 -0.187 -0.126 -0.178 -0.219 -0.152 -0.250 
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Table 5 Market Responses to Significant Negative Events and Fraud Types  
The table documents five dates with the worst three-day returns for 2010-2011. The portfolio level CAR[-1,1] 
is the mean of the abnormal returns for all Chinese firms listed in US. CAR[-1,1] is the difference between the 
cumulative return of each stock and the value-weighted market returns in the three day window around the five 
event dates. We identify the related significant news by reading through business news within a week of each 
date in Panel A. Panel B presents the distribution of CAR [-1,1] around the five events.  
 
Panel A. Five significant negative events  
  Event Date Portfolio 
CAR  
(-1,+1) 
Possible related news within the week 
 
Firm Specific Events  
Event 1 June 7, 2011 -5.45% Muddy Waters Research on Sino-Forest Corporation on 
2011/6/2 (Thursday), Wall Street Journal reported on 
Saturday that Sino-Forest shares take a tumble and 
federal regulators also are investigating some 
accounting firms over their audits of the US-listed 
Chinese firms.  
Event 2 June 17, 
2011 
-6.07% Citron research on Harbin Electric Inc. on 2011/6/17. 
 
Events Impacting all Chinese Firms 
 
Event3 June 8, 2011 -5.37% Interactive Brokers was barring its clients from using 
borrowed money to buy the shares of more than 130 
Chinese companies (WSJ, 2011/6/8); SEC issued an 
investment warning for reverse merger firms on 
2011/6/9. 
Event 4 Sep. 23, 
2011 
-5.49% Reuters published on 2011/9/18: “internal research 
report of CSRC recommended to cancel VIE structure 
of Chinese firms”; On 2011/9/20, China’s Ministry of 
Commerce Spokesman said that the Ministry would 
explore ways to regulate VIE.  
Event 5 Sep. 30, 
2011 
-5.29% “Justice Department probing Chinese accounting” by 
Reuters on 2011/9/29 
 
 
Panel B. Frequency Distribution of CAR (-1, 1) for two firm specific events 
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Table 6 Auditors, Underwriters and Charge Measures for the 1994-2011 IPOs 
The table compares the likelihood of frauds for the IPO firms during 1994-2011 audited by Big 4 affiliates and 
non-Big 4-affiliate auditors (Panel A) or the firms underwritten by prestigious and non-prestigious banks 
(Panel B).  
Panel A. Auditors 
Auditor N SEC Action Charge 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 53 1.8% 22.6% 41.5% 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Zhong Tian 29 10.3% 27.6% 37.9% 
Ernst & Young Hua Ming 19 0% 10.5% 31.6% 
KPMG Huazhen 17 0% 23.5% 35.3% 
Arthur Andersen & Co 3 33.3% 66.7% 66.7% 
Big 4 affiliates 118 3.4% 22.0% 38.1% 
Non Big 4 19 5.3% 21.1% 36.8% 
Difference 99 -1.9% 0.9% 1.30% 
 
Panel B. Underwriters 
Underwriter N SEC Action Charge 
BoA Merrill Lynch 31 6.5% 12.9% 32.3% 
Credit Suisse 31 0.0% 19.4% 35.5% 
Morgan Stanley 28 3.6% 17.9% 28.6% 
Goldman Sachs 19 5.3% 31.6% 47.4% 
Deutsche Bank Securities 16 12.5% 25.0% 56.3% 
Citigroup 16 0.0% 0.0% 12.5% 
J.P. Morgan 15 0.0% 6.7% 20.0% 
Prestigious Underwriters 156 3.8% 16.7% 33.3% 
Other Underwriters 76 2.6% 18.9% 23.7% 
Difference 80 1.2% -2.2% 9.6% 
 
  
1 0 3
6
15
30
72
112
142
69
19
6 2 1 2 1
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Table 7 Institutional Investors and Charge Measures for the 1994-2011 Listings 
Panel A compares institutional holdings of “bad” firms and “good” firms for the 1994-2011 listings. Institutional holdings are measured as the shares held by 
institutions over outstanding common shares at the end of each quarter, in percentage. Q1 indicates the quarter of listing date, and Q2 - Q5 are the four quarters 
following Q1. Panel B describes buy and sell imbalance of institutional trading around IPO lockup expiration. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 
1% respectively. 
 
Panel A. Institutional holdings in five quarters after the listing date 
  Non SEC SEC 
Diff 
t-value 
Non Action Action 
Diff 
t-value 
Non Charge Charge 
Diff 
t-value 
Q1 6.78% 5.81% 0.40  6.38% 7.50% -0.80  6.36% 7.18% -0.64  
Q2 9.85% 10.91% -0.33  9.23% 11.62% -1.32  9.17% 10.96% -1.07  
Q3 9.88% 11.74% -0.61  9.21% 11.95% -1.61  9.45% 10.77% -0.85  
Q4 11.23% 16.19% -1.46  10.42% 14.29% -2.04** 10.55% 12.99% -1.38  
Q5 12.11% 16.71% -1.18  11.07% 15.56% -2.20** 10.84% 14.62% -1.99** 
 
Panel B. Buy and sell imbalance of daily trading by institutional investors around IPO lockup expiration 
  Non SEC SEC 
Diff 
t-value 
Non Action Action 
Diff 
t-value 
Non 
Charge 
Charge 
Diff 
t-value 
[0,+1] -8.05% 24.70% -1.038 -9.24% -0.78% -0.669 -6.60% -8.61% 0.144 
[0,+5] -5.72% -9.01% 0.102 -10.43% 7.02% -1.368 -8.41% 4.53% -0.917 
[0,+10] -3.71% -15.04% 0.342 -8.42% 8.05% -1.252 -3.79% -5.18% 0.095 
[0,+20] -2.82% -0.22% -0.42 -9.53% 16.20% -1.917* -0.77% -10.62% 0.657 
[0,+30] -4.54% 16.13% -1.718 -11.21% 16.55% -2.085** -3.63% -4.87% 0.083 
[0,+40] -3.74% 5.35% -1.03 -10.53% 16.30% -2.134** -3.99% -1.26% -0.194 
[0,+60]  -6.77% -2.63% -0.303 -13.24% 11.78% -2.052** -7.43% -3.47% -0.29 
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Table 8 Regression of Fraud Charges on Different Signals for Old Listings 
The table presents regression results on firm characteristics for three measures of fraud charges: 
SEC - an indicator variable, “1” if a firm faces any SEC litigation regarding accounting issues 
during 2000-2012, “0” otherwise; Action - an indicator variable, “1” if a firm faces any SEC 
litigation or class action regarding accounting issues during 2000-2012, “0” otherwise; Charge - 
an indicator variable, “1” if a firm faces any charge from SEC or shareholder during 2000-2012 or 
media during 2009-2012, “0” otherwise. Industry dummy is based on 2-digit SIC code. See 
Appendix 1 for definition of other variables. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentile. Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
  
  Charges during 2000-2012 Charges within 3-year after listing 
 SEC  Action Charge SEC  Action Charge 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IPO -1.916** -0.964** -0.758** -1.923* -0.672* -0.659** 
 
(-2.53) (-2.45) (-2.22) (-1.89) (-1.68) (-2.00) 
VIE -0.122 -0.585** -0.204 -0.534 -0.324 -0.129 
 
(-0.28) (-1.99) (-0.81) (-0.66) (-1.10) (-0.52) 
Size 0.311 0.730*** 0.450*** 0.754* 0.619*** 0.467*** 
 
(0.96) (3.23) (2.80) (1.74) (3.18) (2.88) 
Leverage -1.847 -3.184*** -2.139*** -4.983* -2.654*** -1.895*** 
 
(-1.12) (-3.96) (-3.35) (-1.79) (-3.43) (-3.03) 
ROA 0.592 -1.050 -0.098 6.597** -0.162 0.557 
 
(0.58) (-1.25) (-0.14) (2.27) (-0.19) (0.82) 
Growth 0.216 0.090 0.115 0.370* 0.101 0.108 
 
(1.56) (1.14) (1.41) (1.92) (1.27) (1.34) 
MB -0.707 1.603* 0.150 0.191 1.846* -0.272 
 
(-0.53) (1.76) (0.20) (0.10) (1.74) (-0.36) 
Accruals -0.027 0.043 0.032 -0.051 0.030 0.025 
 
(-0.41) (1.38) (1.11) (-0.40) (0.93) (0.86) 
Big4AFF -0.040 -0.612 -0.478 -0.443 -0.737 -0.678* 
 
(-0.06) (-1.23) (-1.20) (-0.41) (-1.46) (-1.73) 
Opinion 1.280** 0.608** -0.122 2.682*** 0.439 -0.093 
 
(2.51) (2.06) (-0.42) (3.07) (1.47) (-0.32) 
TIO -0.958 0.343 0.746 0.789 0.663 0.701 
 
(-0.43) (0.36) (0.79) (0.39) (0.67) (0.75) 
Constant -3.233 -5.266 -1.942 -21.662 -14.479*** -12.851*** 
 
(-0.54) (-1.31) (-0.67) (0.00) (-4.28) (-4.40) 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 269 269 269 269 269 269 
Pseudo R2 59.51% 39.13% 32.52% 62.04% 36.73% 31.98% 
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Table 9 Comparison between Privatized Firms and Other Firms 
We define “P” as firms that privatized successfully by the end of 2014 and “NP” as other firms. 
SEC - an indicator variable, “1” if a firm faces any SEC litigation regarding accounting issues 
during 2000-2012, “0” otherwise; Action - an indicator variable, “1” if a firm faces any SEC 
litigation or class action regarding accounting issues during 2000-2012, “0” otherwise; Charge - 
an indicator variable, “1” if a firm faces any charge from SEC or shareholders during 2000-2012 
or media during 2009-2012, “0” otherwise; refer to Appendix 1 for definition of other variables. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. *, ** indicate significance 
levels of 10% and 5% respectively, based on one-tail test.  
 
 
N NP N P 
Difference 
(NP-P) 
T or Z test 
SEC 233 0.086 46 0.022 0.064 1.51* 
Action 233 0.322 46 0.152 0.170 2.31** 
Charge 233 0.446 46 0.326 0.120 1.51* 
IPO 233 0.476 46 0.630 -0.154 -1.91** 
VIE 233 0.408 46 0.435 -0.027 -0.43 
Age 233 7.960 46 8.681 -0.721 -1.05 
Size 225 18.721 46 19.026 -0.305 -2.14** 
Leverage 225 0.292 46 0.280 0.012 0.42 
ROA 225 0.068 46 0.088 -0.020 -1.08 
Growth 224 1.000 46 0.761 0.239 1.52* 
Accruals 225 0.014 46 0.030 -0.016 -0.82 
Loss 225 0.156 46 0.087 0.069 1.21 
CFO 225 0.059 46 0.059 0.001 0.02 
MB 224 3.969 46 3.121 0.848 1.80** 
Price/EBIT 224 23.321 46 23.412 -0.091 -0.01 
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Table 10 Events around regulatory actions between 2011 and 2014 
 
Panel A. Description of regulatory actions 
 
Event Event date Event type 
1 July 6, 2011 PCAOB Statement on Delegation to China: commencement of efforts 
on cooperative resolution to cross-border auditing oversight 
2 Aug. 8, 2011 US-China Joint Press Release on audit oversight of public companies: 
discussed a series of arrangements aiming to build mutual 
understanding and cooperation in the near future 
3 Oct. 3, 2011 PCAOB: Staff Audit Practice Alert No. 8 - Audit Risks in Certain 
Emerging Markets 
4 Oct. 19, 2011 China quizzes audit giants on foreign regulator contact: to ensure that 
firms do not succumb to pressure to hand over documents to regulators 
outside of China 
5 May 8, 2012 Regulator Predicts U.S. Will Soon Take Part in Chinese Inspections of 
Auditors: “ought to be able to observe the inspections they conduct in 
the late summer or fall, and certainly by the end of the year” 
6 Sep. 21, 2012 PCAOB: Speech of Investor Protection through Audit Oversight 
7 Oct. 5, 2012 China, US reach audit inspection agreement: allowing the latter to 
observe official auditor inspections in China 
8 Nov. 8, 2012 U.S. sees talks with China on corporate audits: “on access to audit 
documents” 
9 Dec. 3, 2012 SEC Charges China Affiliates of Big Four Accounting Firms 
10 May 24, 2013 PCAOB Enters into Enforcement Cooperation Agreement with Chinese 
Regulators(MOU) 
11 Jan. 22, 2014 SEC judge rule against China Affiliates of Big Four Accounting Firms 
12 Apr. 21, 2014 China MOF: Provisional Regulations on cross-border auditing business 
of accounting firms (Draft) 
 
Panel B. Market responses 
 
Event Event date Expected sign N CAR(-1,1) t-stat  
1 July 6, 2011 + 223 0.026 3.43 *** 
2 Aug. 8, 2011 ? 226 -0.038 -6.26 *** 
3 Oct. 3, 2011 - 222 -0.050 -7.44 *** 
4 Oct. 19, 2011 - 220 -0.020 -4.29 *** 
5 May 8, 2012 ? 204 -0.012 -2.09 ** 
6 Sep. 21, 2012 ? 194 0.003 0.60  
7 Oct. 5, 2012 + 194 0.000 0.08  
8 Nov. 8, 2012 + 190 0.017 3.10 *** 
9 Dec. 3, 2012 - 187 0.000 -0.01  
10 May 24, 2013 + 176 0.002 0.24  
11 Jan. 22, 2014 - 162 -0.051 -9.78 *** 
12 Apr. 21, 2014 + 160 0.018 4.25 *** 
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Table 11 Comparison of New Chinese IPOs (2012-2014) and Other Three Benchmarking 
Groups 
 
The table presents the characteristics of Chinese IPOs in 2012-2014 and 1994-2011, Non-Lemon 
Chinese IPOs in 1994-2011, and US IPOs in 2012-2014. The differences between the 
characteristics of Chinese IPOs in 2012-2014 and those of other groups are tested and t-values are 
reported. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Variable 
2012-2014 1994-2011 1994-2011 2012-2014 
t-value t-value t-value Chinese 
IPOs 
Chinese 
IPOs 
Non-Lemon 
Chinese 
IPOs 
US IPOs 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) - (2) (1) – (3) (1) – (4) 
Offering Structure 
Underpricing 0.200  0.201  0.147  0.177  -0.02 0.87 0.61 
VIE 23/25 83/140 51/86   3.22*** 3.05***   
Size and Leverage of the Offering 
Size 19.924  19.185  19.089  19.704  3.34*** 3.18*** 0.69 
Leverage 0.325  0.240  0.259  0.459  2.23** 1.71* -3.64*** 
Age 8.213  6.530  6.771  19.452  2.25** 1.81* -8.20*** 
Profitability 
ROA 0.021  0.067  0.074  -0.124  -1.63 -1.97* 5.66*** 
Growth 1.228  1.025  0.898  0.685  0.72 0.62 1.04 
Accruals -0.077  0.007  0.005  -0.0616 -2.65*** -2.98*** -0.88 
Loss 0.400  0.138  0.105  0.558  3.39*** 3.45*** -1.36 
CFO 0.093  0.060  0.068  -0.059  1.01 1.04 6.65*** 
Monitors, Opinion, and Valuation Metrics 
IB Rank 8.196  6.642  6.571  7.786 3.94*** 4.88*** 1.35 
Big4 AFF 0.958  0.877  0.860  0.774  1.17 1.36 2.14** 
Opinion 0.040  0.138  0.151  0.082  -1.34 -1.47 -0.71 
MB 3.621  4.032  3.851  3.948  -0.49 -0.34 -0.3 
Price/EBIT 16.552  36.656  32.481  -4.696  -1.14 -0.99 1.28 
TIO 0.267  0.070  0.068    6.08*** 3.48***   
US Bonding 
NA Sales 0.020  0.032  0.052    -0.47 -1.59   
USEducation 0.360  0.216  0.221    1.56 1.41   
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Table 12 The Effect of Legal Protection on Fraud Charges 
Legal protection is proxied by North America Sales and US Education. NA Sales: the percentage of sales from North America over the total revenue in the listing 
year. US Education: indicator variable, “1” if the CEO receives degree(s) from US institutions, ‘0” if otherwise. Industry dummy is based on 2-digit SIC code. *, **, 
*** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
  
SEC  Action Charge SEC  Action Charge SEC  Action Charge 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
NA Sales -0.465 -3.872 -3.900**    -0.177 -2.524 -3.056* 
 
(-0.15) (-1.51) (-2.40)    (-0.06) (-1.08) (-1.90) 
US Education    -8.357*** -1.249*** -0.831*** -5.947*** -1.078*** -0.654** 
 
   (-7.52) (-3.01) (-2.79) (-5.60) (-2.71) (-2.11) 
Controls, year, industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 
Pseudo R2 59.52% 40.47% 34.22% 58.91% 41.34% 33.99% 36.28% 41.84% 34.88% 
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Figure 1 The figure summarizes equal-weighted raw returns of the portfolio of our sample of US Chinese firms and the China Domestic Market Index from January 
2, 2009 to December 31, 2014. 
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